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PHOENIX ENTERTAINMENT PARTNERS
V. RUMSEY
829 F.3d 817 (2016).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Phoenix Entertainment Partners v. Rumsey,1 Plaintiff
Slep-Tone Entertainment Corporation and its successor in interest,
Phoenix Entertainment Partners LLC (collectively "Slep-Tone") is
a business entity that primarily produces Karaoke accompaniment
tracks for professional Karaoke systems under the trademark
"Sound Choice." 2 The tracks include a pre-recorded version of
popular songs with lead vocals omitted to allow for singing
performances.3 Another component of Sound Choice includes a
display of lyrics to the song along with a variety of visual cues.4
The two components are synchronized to aid performers as they
add their own voice to the musical background.5 In total, Slep-
Tone has released over 16,500 karaoke versions of popular songs. 6
In 2009, Plaintiff adopted a media shifting policy, which
permits customers to copy purchased tracks as long as they have a
1:1 correspondence between tracks purchased and copies made.
For every track copied onto a customer's hard drive, the customer
is required to own the track and maintain the track in its original
medium.8 Thus, a customer must purchase two separate discs with
the original disc if they want to have copies of a particular track on
two separate hard drives. 9
The Basket Case Pub, Inc., the Defendant, is a local Pub
located in Peoria, Illinois.' 0  Defendant provides Karaoke
performance services and owns one or more hard drives that
' Phoenix Entm't Partners v. Rumsey, 829 F.3d 817 (7th Cir. 2016).
2 Id. at 819.
3 Id. at 819-20.
4 Id. at 820.
5id.
6id.
7 Phoenix, 829 F.3d at 820.
8 Id.
9Id.
oId. at 821.
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contain copies of Sound Choice tracks. 1 The issue in Rumsey
arose from the allegation that the pub had been playing
unauthorized digital copies of Plaintiffs Karaoke files instead of
Karaoke files made from legitimately acquired media. 12 Plaintiff
alleged that Defendant violated the Lanham Act, arguing that
playing the unauthorized Karaoke tracks would lead to consumer
confusion, as a patron of the Pub would see Plaintiffs trademark
and wrongfully assumed that the Pub had been using authorized
tracks. 13
Plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Central District of Illinois.1 4 Plaintiffs complaint alleged both
trademark infringement and unfair competition under sections 32
and 43 of The Lanham Act.15  Plaintiff claims that Defendant
violated Slep-Tone's 1:1 Policy by copying a single song on more
than one medium.' 6 Although both the district court and Seventh
Circuit ultimately dismissed Plaintiffs trademark infringement
allegation, the Seventh Circuit Court's opinion goes into
uncommonly great detail to distinguish two prominent areas of
intellectual property, copyright and trademark Law.' 7
II. BACKGROUND
Slep-Tone alleges that by playing "bootleg copies instead of
authorized copies properly made from legitimately acquired Slep-
Tone Media," Defendant breached Plaintiffs Media Shifting
Policy.' 8  Slep-Tone further alleges that this unauthorized use
created a likelihood of consumer confusion because a customer is
likely to see the Sound Choice trademark and associate it with
Slep-Tone, when in fact Defendant is using an unauthorized copy
of Slep-Tone's Karaoke accompaniment tracks.' 9
11 Id.
12 d.
13 Id.
14 Phoenix, 829 F.3d at 818.
" Id. at 822.
16 Id. at 823.
17 Id. at 825.
18 Id. at 821.
19 Id. at 823.
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The district court held that Defendant's use of Plaintiffs
tracks had not violated the Lanham Act and reasoned that
Defendant's unauthorized use of the trademark and trade dress
were unlikely to cause any consumer confusion because customers
would not be likely to see the tracks and associate them with the
Plaintiff.20 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit dismissed and held that
any consumer confusion resulting from the Pub's playing of
unauthorized digital copies of Plaintiffs Karaoke tracks did not
involve passing off tangible goods in the marketplace. 2 1
III. DISCUSSION
In its opinion, the Seventh Circuit discusses the rigid
distinctions between trademark and copyright law. The court
noted that the Plaintiff would have a viable claim for copyright
infringement if Plaintiff had obtained a copyright for its tracks.22
The Seventh Circuit points out that the purpose of copyright law is
to foster creative works of authorship, including literary, musical,
cinematic, and architectural works, 23 whereas the purpose of
trademark law is to foster fair competition rather than promote
creativity.24 Trademark law encourages fair competition by: "(1)
simplifiying] consumer choice, by enabling consumers to rely on a
mark that readily identifies a particular brand and producer, and
(2) it assures the producer of a particular good that it, and not an
imitating competitor, will reap the financial rewards of the good's
(or the brand's) reputation." 2 5 The court goes on to note that while
Slep-Tone does own the trademark to "Sound Choice," they do not
own the Copyright on the creative elements of the Karaoke
Tracks." 26 The opinion stresses that these two areas of law can be
confusingly similar, and while Slep-Tone may have a case for
Copyright infringement, they do not have a claim for trademark
Infringement here.27
20 Phoenix, 829 F.3d at 821.
21 Id. at 818-19.
22 Id. at 824.
23 Id. at 825.
24 id.
25 Id.
26 Phoenix, 829 F.3d at 824.
27 Id. at 825.
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In determining that Slep-Tone's claimed injuries were not
the result of trademark infringement, the Seventh Circuit looked to
the seminal case Dastar v. Twentieth Century Film Corp. 28 The
court noted that in Dastar, the Supreme Court had interpreted the
language "origin of goods," in the Lanham Act to refer only to "the
producer of the tangible goods that are offered for sale, and not to
the author of any idea, concept, or communication embodied in
those goods." 2 9 It is important to note that the court rejected the
argument that the "origin of goods" should include both the actual
producer of the physical good, and the creator of the content
conveyed by the good. 3 0 This is especially important when dealing
with issued involving books, videos, CDs and other goods where
the actual good is more valued for its intangible, intellectual
content, than its physical qualities. 3 1 To exclude a creator of the
content conveyed by a good like a Book, CD or DVD is an
extremely narrow interpretation of the Lanham Act.3 2 This narrow
interpretation has ultimately made it significantly more difficult
for a Plaintiff to meet the burden of proof for trademark
infringement.3 3
The Seventh Circuit applied two important rulings from
Dastar to the present case. First, Dastar emphasized important
distinctions between copyright and trademark law, and cautions
against allowing a trademark claim to substitute for what in real
terms is a claim for copyright infringement. 3 4 Second, Dastar
considered and rejected a broader understanding of the "Origin of
Goods" for communicative products that consumers will value
more for the intellectual and creative content they convey than
their physical form. 3 5
Applying Dastar, the Seventh Circuit first identified the
tangible goods at issue in this case to be the "unauthorized digital
copy of the Sound Choice karaoke tracks... made ... by the
28 Id. at 826. See also Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539
U.S. 23 (2003).
29 Phoenix, 829 F.3d at 827.
30 id.
3Id.32 Id. at 828.
33 Id. at 828-29.
34 Id. at 827. See also Dastar, 539 U.S. at 34.
3 Phoenix, 829 F.3d at 828. See also Dastar, 539 U.S. at 33.
44
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Defendants." 36 The Seventh Circuit then determined whether or
not the Defendants use of Plaintiffs trademark leads to confusion
about the source of that particular good. While the Seventh
Circuit did recognize that a patron might see the Sound Choice
mark whenever the graphic component of the Karaoke track is
displayed, they had trouble determining what the patron would be
confused about.3 8 "When a patron sees the mark, a patron may
believe that she is seeing and hearing content that was created by
Slep-Tone. And she is." 3 9 Dastar specifically emphasizes that the
consumer confusion must be confusion as to the source of the
tangible good sold in the marketplace. 40 Here, any confusion is
not related to the source of the tangible good sold in the
marketplace, as Dastar requires. 4 1 Furthermore, the Sound Choice
mark is visually embedded in the creative content and does not
falsely suggest that Slep-Tone is endorsing the performance.42
Lastly, the court addressed Plaintiffs concern about their
products being compressed excessively during the duplication
process and how this may make the unauthorized copy's quality
poor, and when played, may lead viewers to think Slep-Tone
products are of inferior quality.43 The court held that the
Plaintiffs assertion was invalid because, "[D]efendants are not
passing off a tangible good sold in the marketplace as a Slep-Tone
good".44 Defendant is not selling compact discs and billing them
as genuine,45 as Defendant is not even in the business of selling
compact discs.46 Thus, the Seventh Circuit rejected all of
Plaintiffs assertions and held that Defendant was not liable for
trademark infringement.
3 6 Phoenix, 829 F.3d at 828.
37 id.
Id. at 828-29.
SId. at 829.
4 0 ld. See also Lanham Trademark Act §§ 32, 43, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125
(2012).
41 Phoenix, 829 F.3d at 829.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 830-31.
44 Id. at 831.
45 id.
46 m
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IV. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
There are several reasons why Phoenix Entertainment
Partners v. Rumsey could have a significant impact on future
litigation in the field of intellectual property law. First, the
Seventh Circuit's opinion goes to unusually great lengths to
distinguish trademark law from other areas of intellectual property
law.47 These distinctions are extremely important because not
only are they entirely different statutory standards, but even the
policy reasons behind trademark law and other areas are of
intellectual property law are dissimilar.4 8 The policy behind
trademark protection is not to foster creativity, as the Lanham Act
is much more commercially motivated than the Copyright Act.
The court's comments about the Lanham Act "established a
federal right of action for trademark infringement to protect both
consumer confidence in the quality and source of goods and
businesses' goodwill in their products.'A 9  The court further
emphasized the importance of these distinctions when it said; "[I]t
can in some cases be challenging to identify which right is truly at
issue when a claim of infringement is asserted.50
There are two likely explanations as to why the Seventh
Circuit went into such great detail when distinguishing these two
areas of the law. One could be the court's desire to prevent other
plaintiffs from asserting trademark infringement claims when they
should be asserting copyright or patent infringement claims
instead. Another, perhaps more likely, reason could be because it
is becoming more prevalent for a plaintiff to file a frivolous suit in
an attempt to receive compensation from settlement. The court
explained:
It seems like we're seeing more and more of these
kinds of cases - using patents, copyrights and
trademarks to bring mass lawsuits against a
number of companies who may or may not
infringe, where the goal often appears to be to
47 Phoenix, 829 F.3d at 825.
481 Id. at 822.
49 d.
'old at 825.
46
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push for settlements for a few thousand dollars
(often cheaper than defending the lawsuit). It
seems like this is a form of abuse of the judicial
system, effectively relying on the threat of an
expensive trial as a weapon to pressure
companies (and, in some cases, though not in the
above cases, individuals) into settling and just
paying up to avoid the hassle and expense.5 1
The danger of plaintiffs threatening defendants with litigation is
greatly concerning, and the court's lengthy explanation in Rumsey
could deter not only Slep-Tone, but other potential plaintiffs from
frivolously threatening litigation when they are merely seeking
quick compensation from settlement.
Another important implication resulting from this decision is
that this case perfectly demonstrates how narrowly courts have
interpreted the "origination of goods" language under Dastar.
Cases like Rumsey and Dastar have construed the "origin of
goods" language in the Lanham Act so narrowly that one must be
the "producer of the tangible goods that are offered for sale.... ,52
The court rejected the contention that the "origin of goods" might
not only include the original producer of the goods, but in
situations involving products like books or videos, the creator of
the content conveyed by the book." 53 Further, the narrow view of
Dastar expands to the construal of the likelihood of confusion
standard in the Lanham Act. The court ruled that Plaintiff had
failed to show that a consumer would likely be confused as to the
source of the tangible good sold in the marketplace.54 The Seventh
Circuit's narrow construal of the Lanham Act in both Rumsey and
Dastar may deter future plaintiffs away from trademark
infringement suits and towards copyright infringement suits,
assuming that the plaintiff does indeed own the copyright.
s1 Mike Masnick, 97 Las Vegas Karaoke Locations Sued by 'Righthaven of
Trademarks' Demanding $500 Million, TECH DIRT (Feb. 20, 2012),
https://www.techdirt.com/blog/?company=slep-tone.
52 Phoenix, 829 F.3d at 827. See also Dastar 539 U.S. at 31.
5 Phoenix, 829 F.3d at 827.
54 Id. at 831.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit's opinion in Rumsey is an illustration of
how it has become increasingly difficult to assert trademark
infringement allegations under the Lanham Act. Proving that a
defendant's use of a trademark is likely to cause confusion to
customers has become increasingly more burdensome for
plaintiffs. Here, Plaintiff Phoenix Entertainment could not even
successfully plead that the unauthorized compression of its works,
consequently distorting the quality of the work, was likely to cause
confusion to consumers. Under Dastar, the confusion must be
confusion as to the source of the tangible good sold in the
marketplace.56
Another interesting takeaway from Rumsey is how the court
goes out of its way to explain not only the statutory differences
between copyright and trademark Law, but also the policies behind
both of these areas of law. The policies behind trademark law
have always been commercially inspired, while copyright law has
more to do with incentivizing creativity and inventiveness. The
Seventh Circuit took no exception to these policies when it ruled
that Plaintiff could not recover under the Lanham Act because
there was not a likelihood of confusion. This is likely attributed to
the fact that frivolous lawsuits involving areas of intellectual
property law are becoming more prevalent.
While often intertwined, "the rights protected by trademark
and copyright laws are distinct, and it can in some cases be
challenging to identify which right is truly at issue when a claim
for infringement is asserted."5 7  The Rumsey opinion, when
coupled with Dastar, perfectly explain and provide an example of
the subtle but important distinctions between perhaps the two
largest areas of intellectual property law.
Jordan Melvin*
Id. at 830.
56 Id. at 829. See also Lanham Trademark Act §§ 32, 43, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114,
1125 (2012).
57 Phoenix, 829 F.3d at 825.
DePaul University College of Law, Juris Doctor expected May 2017.
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